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1 Introduction
Firms use work teams and team bonuses for a number of reasons.1 However, when
assessed strictly in terms of worker motivation, team bonuses appear to be an inef-
ficient way to organize production due to free-rider problems. With a team bonus,
individual workers bear the entire cost of their work effort, but receive only a fraction
of the bonus generated. Selfish calculation of the costs and benefits thus predicts
low effort and performance in teams. However, this outcome potentially differs if
workers are sensitive to comparisons with their co-workers, social appraisal, and
the pressure to perform that naturally arise when collective achievements determine
worker pay. Furthermore, relative performance in the past may then matter for
current performance. The strength and structure of such dynamic team effects, and
the extend to which they depend on team pay, are the topic of this paper.
We obtain our data from the customer service centre of an insurance company.
This is a so-called inbound call centre where agents provide information and sell
insurance to those calling in during daytime from Monday to Friday. The agents
operate in teams of 8–12 members and receive a bonus that depends on both indi-
vidual worker sales and team sales. Agents are informed about how well they are
doing relative to the average performance of their team. Every Monday morning,
the team leaders inform sales agents about their own sales and the average sales
in the team in the preceding week. Completely self-contained workers are insensi-
tive to peer comparisons and will be unmoved by information about the previous
week’s relative performance. However, more socially responsive workers may feel
both intrinsic and extrinsic pressure to exert greater effort if they receive negative
information about their relative performance (Barankay, 2012).
To examine the effects of information sharing and feedback in a team setting,
we use six years of weekly productivity records for individual workers who work in
permanent teams to construct a dynamic panel model. We estimate how relative
performance ranking the previous week, which is information provided to workers
every Monday morning, affects agent productivity in the current week. We do this
under two different remuneration schemes: one with a mix of individual and team
based bonus, and one where bonus payments are based on individual production
only.
1These include potential effects on performance, quality, risk sharing, absenteeism, employee
turnover, plant structures, operating norms and work processes through information sharing,
worker involvement, downtime, etc. (Bishop et al., 2000; Hackman et al., 2000; Harris, 2011;
Jones and Kato, 2011).
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We find evidence of an inverse relationship between the response in individual
performance and the previous quartile rank in the team, where low–ranked workers
in a given week respond by increasing sales relative to higher–ranked workers in terms
of productivity. Another interesting observation is that the co-worker productivity
effects and rank effects disappear and are not significant during a period when
individual sales entirely determine the bonus. A transition to team bonus changes
how workers respond to changes in the productivity of other team members based on
information provided on Monday morning meetings. Overall, our findings suggest
that information sharing about own and team productivity, especially in a team
bonus setting, may provide greater motivation than the standard principal–agent
model suggests.
The empirical literature on team dynamics focuses on three factors: the remuner-
ation scheme (flat-rate, piece-rate, and team-based wages), the information about
relative performance within teams (no information versus full information on own
and team member performance in previous periods) and the effect of team member
productivity (peer effects). Hamilton et al. (2003) and Hansen (1997) assess the
productivity effect of switching from individual to team pay, and find that such
a change increases average productivity within the firm, indicating that there are
other factors than free-rider motivation that play a role in performance in work
teams. For example, Hansen (1997) concludes that the change in productivity cor-
relates negatively with the workers’ initial productivity. This suggests that team
pay creates pressure aimed towards low productivity workers. This interpretation is
consistent with Weiss (1987), who finds that the introduction of team pay induces
low productivity workers to leave the firm. Babcock et al. (2015) design an exper-
iment to investigate team motivation and find that individuals “work harder” in a
team with a team bonus than they do in the presence of individual bonuses. They
argue that there are many motivations (altruism, guilt aversion, shame, a longing
for positive social appraisal, etc.) that induce individuals to exert extra effort to
“avoid letting down their team”.
Mohnen et al. (2008) discuss the effect of the information structure on team
dynamics where remuneration is based on total production in the group. They
analyse a setting where agents obtain information either after the game or at an
interim stage, and explain how information affects performance, in particular how
low productivity workers increase effort early in the game. Azmat and Iriberri (2016)
study the effect of providing relative performance feedback under piece-rate versus
flat-rate payment. They find that performance feedback matters under a piece-
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rate scheme, but not when pay is unrelated to performance. Moreover, the effect
of feedback is independent of relative position, that is whether they are above or
below the average. However, the effect of performance feedback under team-based
payment was not estimated in their study.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the
setting in which we estimate the effect of feedback on performance under different
bonus schemes in our observation period from 2003 to the end of 2008. Section
3 details our empirical identification strategy and Section 4 presents the data and
econometric specifications. Section 5 provides the empirical results along with sen-
sitivity analysis and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Setting
Our data are from the customer service centre of a large insurance company. The
service centre receives incoming calls from existing and potential new customers.
The phone system in the customer service centre automatically channels new calls
to available operators. The operators, who use the computer system to retrieve
information needed to assist customers, and to register new information in the cus-
tomer database. The operators’ main assignment is to provide accurate information
in a friendly and courteous way. Their job is to inform existing clients about their in-
surance coverage, update them on any policy changes that seem relevant and inform
them about new products that are available. To provide high-quality services the
operators must pay careful attention to the customer’s requests and have extensive
knowledge about the company’s insurance products. In addition, they must handle
requests for information as quickly as possible to minimize the time other customers
have to wait for assistance. Ideally, most of the work, the provision of information,
changes in existing insurance contracts, registration of new contracts, etc., should
be done online during the phone call.
In addition to service provision (helping customers with queries relating to their
insurance contracts), the operators sell insurance products. The company offers a
bonus to promote sales. With a yearly sales target of NOK 3.6 million (approxi-
mately USD 500,000) per full-time agent, the customer service centre is an important
source of income for the company, accounting for approximately 30% of total sales
in the company in 2008. Our particular call centre is open only during daytime from
Monday to Friday, and operates all year round.
Agents work in teams thatare clustered together in open office landscapes. The
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management’s stated goal is to have 8–12 members in each team, but there are
periods when teams have fewer permanent members due to turnover. The average
length of employment for agents in the call centre over the period of our data is 3.5
years. Some of those who quit get another job in the same company while others
leave the company. The call centre recruits new agents twice a year and runs an
intensive three–week training programme before agents are allocated to teams that
are short–handed of agents (relative to the preferred team size). To the extent that
it is possible, the management tries to balance teams with respect to the gender,
education, sales experience, and age of the agents. Agents work only for one team.
Although there are a few instances, less than a handful, where agents are transferred
from one operative team to another. Over the period of our data, three teams were
closed, while three new teams were formed.
Each team has a team leader who organizes the work within the team, motivates
the agents, and monitors their performance. One of the team leader’s tasks is to
inform agents about their absolute and relative performance at the start of each
week. We hypothesize that the updated information about previous sales in the
team affects individual performance in the current week.
Some agents work part-time, usually having a 20% position, many of whom
are college students. They are not included in the team bonus system, and work
in separate teams. We exclude part-time workers and their teams from the main
analysis.
2.1 The bonus scheme
In 2001, the firm introduced a performance bonus to increase sales in the customer
service unit. Since the company intended to use performance pay on a regular basis,
a union treaty signed by the employer and employee organizations, obliged the firm
to negotiate the contract with union representatives. The contract was renegotiated
on an annual basis. In the first year, the bonus was based on team performance alone.
In 2004, the firm did not reach an agreement with the union and the performance
pay contract was not renewed. However, although the management refused to sign
the bonus contract in 2004, they had not lost faith in incentive pay. They decided
to carry on with performance pay, but the bonus was now introduced as a short
term quarterly campaign. By relabelling the scheme as quarterly campaigns, the
management did not have to negotiate the outline of the bonus scheme with the
union. The first campaign was introduced in the second quarter of 2004 and replaced
the negotiated bonus.
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The importance of the bonus has increased over time: in 2001, bonus pay
amounted to (on average) 7% of salaries; by 2010 it had increased to almost 15% of
total worker remuneration. Given that this is a customer service centre, the sales
bonus has always been balanced with rewards (based on various indicators) relating
to service provision in the firm. However, the sales bonus has always been the most
important element in the performance pay scheme, accounting for approximately
80% of variable pay.
Since 2004, the sales bonus has depended on both individual worker and team
sales. The relative importance of these two elements has varied somewhat over
time, except for the fourth quarter of 2006 when there was a major reform in the
bonus scheme. The company increased the power of the bonus and made it 100%
dependent on individual sales. This scheme remained in place for two quarters. The
company reintroduced a bonus that depended on both individual and team sales in
April 2007; see Table 1 for details about the bonus scheme.
Table 1: The evolution of bonus schemes in the call centre
Pay reform Ind. bonus Team bonus Total bonus Notes
Q1 2003 - 10000 10000 Only team bonus
Q2 2003 - 11000 11000 -
Q2 2004 3000 3000 12000 Team/Individual
Q3 2004 4500 1500 12000 -
Q1 2005 6750 1500 15000 -
Q2 2005 8250 3750 18000 -
Q3 2005 9900 2250 19650 -
Q4 2005 11200/2800 2800/11200 17000 Choice of model
Q4 2006 42250 - 45250 Pointsystem/Individual
Q2 2007 13000 7000 24800 Team/Individual
Q1 2008 16000 7000 30000 50/50 weight on sales and premium
Q2 2008 18000 6000 30000 -
Q4 2008 18000 8000 30000 -
Q1 2009 18000 6000 30000 100% weight on sales premium
Notes: This table shows the maximal total sales bonus payment in NOK that a worker can achieve divided into
payments based on individual sales and team sales per quarter. A bonus of NOK 30000 per quarter equals around
USD 1600 per month. The maximal total bonus is different from the sum of individual and team payment because
the total bonus also depends on other parameters over the period.
A full-time employed agent is assigned a sales target (in 2006 the individual
target was to sell 22 units of insurance per week). To obtain the individual sales
bonus, agents must surpass their assigned monthly target. The bonus increases in a
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stepwise fashion for sales above the budget, with the number of steps and the width
and height of the steps varying over time. Agents obtain a team bonus if the team
sells more than the team target, which is given by the sum of the individual targets
in the team. The maximal bonus payment that a worker can achieve varies from
NOK 10,000 per quarter at the beginning of the observation period to NOK 45,250
per quarter in the two quarters with a high powered individual bonus. It then drops
to around NOK 30,000 in the period after the individual bonus experiment.
The six month period (from 1 October 2006 to 31 March 2007) with high–
powered individual incentives provides an opportunity to examine to what extent
the feedback on rank position within a team depends on team incentives.
3 Research question and identification
Our data are especially well suited for assessing the following research question: How
does feedback to workers on relative performance within a production team impact
on subsequent productivity? Will, for example, information that one is at the low
end of performance within a team, motivate agents to increase their current effort?
Our data also enable us to examine if the response to feedback on past performance
depend on the bonus system; that is whether the response depend on there being a
team bonus or not.
The productivity of an agent in a particular week is determined by the innate
ability and effort of the agent and by external factors (demand factors). Ability is
given, but effort is chosen and will depend (among other things) on the pay system
(financial incentives), on feedback and encouragement from the team leader, and on
co-worker peer effects. Ideally, we would randomize changes in all of these variables
and estimate their causal effects on productivity. Although we do not have an ideal
randomized design, the fact that we have very accurate and detailed individual
productivity data over many time periods enables us to analyse the data with fixed
effects for workers, weeks and team-specific time trends.
However, even with such detailed data, it is challenging to identify peer effects
within a production team (Manski, 1993; Angrist, 2014). The reflection problem
and common productivity shocks within a team make it difficult to isolate how the
performance of teammates affects that of individual team members within a week.
Instead, we focus on a different question, namely, how previous relative performance
within a team affects current performance.
We are in a position to estimate this effect because workers obtain information
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on their relative performance in the previous week every Monday morning. There
is substantial variation in relative performance from week to week and part of this
variation is exogenous; that is, it depends on team composition (the team members
who were active that previous week) and on external factors (the number of incoming
calls, the type of customer that calls in, etc.). We use that variation to estimate
how relative performance affects current performance. A major concern in this
estimation is reversion to the mean; in that case, the change in performance from
week to week would be mechanical. To check for this, we first note that reversion
to the mean should be symmetrical (those who performed well in week t− 1 should
reduce their performance while those who were at the bottom should improve their
performance). Second, we carry out placebo estimation where we randomly place
workers in teams and run the same analysis.
Because workers rarely change teams, issues related to endogenous team forma-
tion are not important in our context. The company has a policy that teams should
be as equal as possible. Thus, there should be no ex ante selection into teams in
the service centre. The teams seem to be balanced in relation to factors such as
gender, age, work experience, skills, etc. We note some variation in observed vari-
ables between the approximately 25 sales teams in the firm. For instance, the male
percentage varies from 36 to 57 (min-max), and the mean age varies from 27 to 37
years, so the balancing of workers is not ex post perfect. Because there are relatively
few workers in each team, some variation in mean characteristics of team members
is inevitable.2
4 Data
The novelty of this paper lies in the productivity data we use to estimate the effect
of incentives, rank-position, and co-worker productivity within teams. We observe
individual productivity, defined as the number of units sold per logged work hour
(log-in time on the telephone system) on a weekly basis from Week 1 in 2003 to
Week 52 in 2008.
There are several reasons why these data are attractive for our purposes. First,
the frequency of the data enables us to replicate the information structure within
the company, making it possible to identify policy–relevant effects. Second, the
2Our empirical specification uses fixed effects for workers, weeks and team-specific time trends.
Thus, we do not include variables such as gender, age, and work experience in our estimation
equation. Other variables that are time constant, for example education, are also not included in
the empirical analysis.
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employees are in well-defined teams. Accordingly, in a given week, we know the
exact contribution of each member’s output in the group, making it possible to
identify the production gaps. Finally, as the number of sold products determines
the team bonus, we are able to link our measure of productivity directly to the
externalities within the team.
Not only is it rare to have detailed and frequent observations of individual pro-
ductivity over such a long time span, it is also rare to have performance data from a
normal firm. Most case studies on performance pay are conducted in the laboratory
or, if in the field, data are gathered from workers in rather particular occupations,
such as fruit picking, tree logging, windscreen installers and cashiers in retail shops
etc. The fraction of workers employed in such industries, where contracts are short
term and no or little formal education is required, is small. In contrast, the customer
service industry is large and fast growing. In our case, most of the workers have a
bachelor’s degree and the length of average employment is 3,5 years.
As noted in our description of the performance pay scheme, there has always
been some balance between the sales bonus and bonus payments linked to various
indicators of the quality of the services provided. Most of these comprise aggregate
performance at the centre level (average waiting time for callers, average renewal
rates of existing customers). We do not have individual data on any of these service
indicators. Thus, we focus solely on sales productivity in this analysis.
4.1 Group variables
We use two separate measures to capture the gaps in productivity between individual
agents and their teammates. Our first measure is the absolute distance between the
productivity levels of the individual and the average co-worker. There is arguably
a positive relation between lagged average co-worker productivity and current pro-
ductivity because of the presence of team dynamics. Our second measure to capture
productivity gaps is the quartile rank, that is, an individual worker’s position relative
to co-workers. Given our context of well-defined teams, it is reasonable to assume
that social pressure is aimed towards agents in the lower part of the productivity
distribution as these agents reduce the expected income of their team members. In
this case, the increase in productivity should be inversely related to the previous
quartile rank, that is, the effect on subsequent productivity should be greater when
the agent is placed in the bottom part of the productivity distribution (first quartile)
compared with the upper part of the productivity distribution (fourth quartile), all
else being equal.
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The rank measure can be defined in different ways. We could use an indicator
for top performers, or an indicator for production above or below the average (or
median). We could in principle also use more than four quartiles. However, the
average number of persons working is on average eight per team each week. The
results do not change if we use three or five quartiles. We do not find any significant
results if we divide the sample in two.
4.2 Descriptive statistics
Our sample includes full-time employees working during the period 2003–2008.
There are a number of other available performance variables, including the mon-
etary value of the sold products, the number of answered phone calls and absence
for sickness. However, we choose to base our measure of productivity on the number
of sales, rather than their value, because it links to the bonus reward throughout
the entire period under study. We observe the number of sales each week and logged
work hours (log-in time), defined as the amount of time workers are logged on to
the computer system. Agents are required to log on to the phone system after they
arrive at work and log off if instructed to do back-office work, participate in courses,
training, meetings, or when taking breaks, etc.
We exclude weekly observations when (1) the log–on time is less than one hour
per week, (2) the workers have not answered any incoming calls during a week, and
(3) when there are fewer than four co-workers on the team. We also exclude workers
logged on to the computer system for less than 10 hours per week on average during
the entire period. This eliminates team leaders who may log on for short periods
when there is heavy traffic on the lines. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for
the sample of workers we use in the analysis.
The average team sales excluding worker i are 22.18 sold products per week,
and the figure per logged work hour (log-in time) excluding worker i is 1.05. The
average number of hours logged on the telephone system is 23.89, defined as logged
work hours per week (log-in time). The average individual productivity is 1.05 sold
products per logged hour of work, with a standard deviation of 1.082 per logged
hour of work. As seen, there is less variation in average co-worker productivity over
time, indicating that shocks to individual productivity tend to cancel each other out
within groups. The standard deviation for average team sales per logged work hour
(excluding worker i) is 0.57.
On a typical week, the average number of team members who are present is 8.3.
Team sizes are relatively stable over time. Importantly, changes in team size may
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics, 2003-2009
Mean Std.dev.
Number of sales 22.18 13.69
Hours logged on to the telephone system 23.89 9.234
Sales per logged work hour 1.051 1.082
Average team sale (excluding worker i) 22.18 7.994
Average team logged work hours 23.89 7.743
(excluding worker i)
Average team sale per logged work 1.05 0.57
hour (excluding worker i)
Team size (present) 8.29 2.414
Notes: This table reports means and standard deviations. The average
number of individuals in a given week is around 300, and the average
number of weekly observation per individual is around 90.
affect individual productivity because the cost associated with the monitoring of
co-workers increases as team size increases. An increase in team size may therefore
result in a lower level of monitoring with ensuing effects on individual productivity.
The co-ordination costs of larger teams increase (Hackman et al., 2000).
In addition to average co-worker productivity, we also use the quartile rank to
measure the productivity gaps. To identify how the previous position relative to co-
workers influences individual productivity, all else being equal, there must be some
mobility in the quartile rank from week to week. Table 3 provides a transformation
matrix for the quartile rank, indicating some stability from week to week, especially
in the lower quartiles. For instance, 34.13% of workers in the fourth quartile in
period t remain in the fourth quartile in the next period. Nonetheless, there may
be sufficient mobility to identify differences in productivity levels as a result of the
previous position relative to co-workers.3
Both pressure from team members and self-respect may induce workers to make
up for large negative productivity gaps in the previous week between themselves
and the team average. Team pressure requires some stability in the composition of
the team over time. Assume, for example, that none of your co-workers this week
were present the previous week. In this situation, these co-workers do not have the
3The mobility between quartiles is likely a result of two factors, namely, variation in individual
productivity from week to week, and changes in the composition of teams. In other words, a worker
positioned in the first quartile in one week may end up in a higher quartile the next week because
of a different team composition owing to sick leave, recreational leave, seminar activity, etc., and
not necessarily because of changes in individual productivity.
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Table 3: Transformation matrix for position in the produc-
tivity distribution
Q1 (t+1) Q2 (t+1) Q3 (t+1) Q4 (t+1) Total
Q1 (t) 40.33 24.87 22.25 12.55 100
(3,969) (2,447) (2,190) (1,235) (9,841)
Q2 (t) 32.28 25.26 26.20 16.26 100
(2,470) (1,933) (2,005) (1,244) (7,625)
Q3 (t) 24.33 23.67 30.09 21.90 100
(2,103) (2,046) (2,601) (1,893) (8,643)
Q4 (t) 19.17 18.53 28.18 34.13 100
(1,259) (1,217) (1,851) (2,242) (6,569)
Total 29.97 23.37 26.44 20.22 100
(9,801) (7,643) (8,647) (6,614) (32,705)
Notes: Numbers are in percent. Number of observations in parentheses. Q1 =
quartile 1, Q2 = quartile 2, Q3 = quartile 3, and Q4 = quartile 4 of the produc-
tivity distribution, where Q1 indicates low productivity and Q4 high productivity
in a given week.
opportunity to exert pressure based on your performance the previous week. In our
setting, this is equivalent to a situation where the workers cannot observe the effort of
their co-workers, and internal pressure (i.e., altruistic behaviour, competitive spirit,
etc.) will be the only effective source of pressure.
4.3 Econometric specifications
Our dependent variable, yi,g,t, is the productivity of worker i in group/team g at
week t. We specify an empirical model using both own lagged individual production
(i.e., a dynamic specification) and team variables, and we estimate different variants
of the following model:







i,g,t−1 + µt + µgt+ εi,g,t,
where yi,g,t−1 is the sales of an individual in the previous period per hour worked,
and β1 captures the dependence in own productivity over time. xg,t is a vector of
exogenous variables including team size. αi represents the individual specific fixed
effects, µgt captures team specific time trends, and µt is a set of dummy variables
for time (week fixed effects). The variable y−i,g,t−1 is the average productivity of the
other members of the team in the previous week, and the coefficient β4 measures the
effect of an increase in co-worker productivity on subsequent individual productivity
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the next week.
We also build on Rees et al. (2003), where we estimate how individual produc-
tivity is affected by the position relative to the other members of the team. We thus
include dummy variables for the position in quartile j, where Qji,g,t−1, j = 1, 2, 3, 4.
The base category is a position in the fourth quartile (highest performers), while the
first quartile indicates low performance in week t. The parameters θj measure the
effect on productivity in week t associated with placement in quartile j relative to
placement in the upper quartile in week t− 1. To the degree productivity pressure
is aimed towards agents in the bottom quartiles, we expect the parameters θj to be
positive.
The dynamic structure of the model, by including yi,g,t−1 as an independent
variable in the model, raises two new problems that are closely related. First,
the average co-worker productivity at time t − 1 may be affected by individual
productivity at time t − 2. In other words, individual productivity may affect the
productivity of the other members of the team in a later period. This implies that
y−i,g,t−1 is correlated with the error term in period t − 2. In this case y−i,g,t−1 is
said to be weekly exogenous, or predetermined. The second problem arises because
the model in itself is a dynamic panel data model; lagged individual productivity
is included among the background variables, and is per definition correlated with
the error term in period t − 1. The problem arises because the error term in the
fixed effect transformation contains the history of the error terms in all periods.
Nickell (1981) was the first to give an analytical expression of the bias. However, as
the number of time periods increases, the bias goes towards zero. As a result, the
fixed effects estimator is consistent as both N → ∞ and T → ∞. In long panels,
the dynamic panel bias becomes insignificant, and a straightforward fixed effects
estimator works fine (Roodman, 2009). Our data contain weekly observations over
six years (312 time periods in total) where the average individual is observed in
approximately 90 periods.4
4Although the fixed effects estimator is consistent in a large T perspective there is in theory
a relatively simple way to avoid this problem by using internal instruments after taking first




This section presents the baseline results from the models presented in the previous
section. The dependent variable is the log of sales per logged work hour. All regres-
sions include weekly fixed effects to control for time trends and seasonal variation
in the data. These indicator variables will also capture the effect of different bonus
systems since the bonus system applies for all workers and teams in the company but
differs over time according to Table 1. The regressions also include individual and
team-specific fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity between workers
and teams in the service centre. Individual time-constant variables, such as gender
and education, are not included in the regressions. Variables that are correlated
with time, such as age and seniority, are also not included.
The results in column (1) in Table 4 are based on the dynamic linear-in-means
model from equation (1), but exclude the quartile indicator variables; the results in
columns (2) and (3) also consider the relative position in the productivity distribu-
tion. Column (4) estimates the same model as in column (3) using the Anderson-
Hsiao (IV-first-difference) estimator, which gave relatively large standard errors
throughout.
In principle, there are two ways an agent can increase their own productivity in
our setting, namely, by answering more calls or by increasing the sales effort per
answered call. As our dependent variable controls for logged work hours, we do not
distinguish between these two effort channels.
The lagged dependent variable is positive and statistically significant in all mod-
els indicating that shocks to individual productivity persist over time. We also
control for team size in Table 4, which has a negative effect on productivity. The
estimated effect is similar in models reported in columns (1)–(3), where a one-unit
increase in team size results in a reduction in individual productivity of approxi-
mately 0.6%.
The results of the dynamic linear-in-means model in column (1) suggest a posi-
tive relationship between average co-worker productivity and subsequent individual
productivity (β4 in equation (1)). The results in column (1) indicate that a 10%
increase in co-worker productivity is associated with a 0.4% increase in individual
productivity the following week. The estimated coefficient is relatively small in mag-
nitude. The positive estimate indicates that there are mechanisms present within
the teams that partly internalize the positive externalities caused by team-based
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Table 4: Dynamic fixed effects estimation of co-worker and rank
effects on individual productivity from 2003 to 2009.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual productivity, 0.130*** 0.144*** 0.151*** 0.0357**
previous week (0.0059) (0.0098) (0.0087) (0.0159)
Team size, previous week -0.0067*** -0.0066*** -0.00650** -0.0114
(0.00254) (0.00255) (0.00255) (0.0118)
Peers’ average productivity, 0.0398*** 0.0257
previous week (0.0127) (0.0149)
First quartile, previous week 0.0293* 0.0433*** 0.0283
(0.0156) (0.0134) (0.0223)
Second quartile, previous 0.0160 0.0247** 0.0044
week (0.0123) (0.0112) (0.0181)
Third quartile, previous week 0.0139 0.0190** 0.0135
(0.0101) (0.0096) (0.0150)
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes FD
Week fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Team-specific trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations (N × T ) 28996 28996 28996 23048
Notes: The dependent variable is log of sales per logged hours of work as a measure of individual
productivity. First quartile previous week means that the worker is ranked in the lowest productivity
quartile the previous week. Team-specific trends are linear. Column (4) reports the results from an
Anderson-Hsiao (IV-first-difference) estimator. Stars denote significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01
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incentives. In other words, the workers correct for gaps in earlier productivity levels
by increasing effort the following week.5
It is reasonable to assume that any pressure within the team in favour of per-
formance is primarily aimed towards agents in the bottom part of the productivity
distribution. The subsequent productivity level associated with placement in the
bottom part of the productivity distribution should then be higher than that for
placement in the upper part of the productivity distribution. In columns (2) and
(3) in Table 4, we therefore include the previous quartile rank as an independent
variable, as in equation (1). The results in column (2) thus control for both average
co-worker productivity and the individual worker’s position relative to co-workers.
The effect of an increase in co-worker productivity is positive, but not significant in
this model. The effect of placement in the lower part of the productivity distribution
is also positive, and significant at the 10% level.
One possible explanation for the change in the effect of average co-worker produc-
tivity from model (1) to (2) might be that the position of individual workers relative
to co-workers captures the same effects, making it difficult to separate them. In col-
umn (3), we therefore exclude average co-worker productivity, and analyse how the
position relative to co-workers affects individual productivity. The effect of place-
ment in the first quartile relative to placement in the fourth quartile here is positive
and statistically significant at the 1% level. We estimate the subsequent increase in
productivity level associated with placement in the bottom quartile to be about 4.3%
higher relative to placement in the upper quartile. The relative effect of placement
in the second quartile is also positive but the effect is smaller (2.5%). The effect in
the third quartile is 1.9%. The results presented here are then consistent with those
in column (1), where the workers correct for gaps in previous productivity levels
by increasing effort the following week.6 Column (4) presents the results from the
IV-approach mentioned in footnote 4, but this model gave large standard errors.
The baseline results in Table 4 do not reveal anything about the underlying
mechanisms. Social pressure, pressure from the team leader, and/or information
exchanges and co-operation between the members of the team could all then poten-
tially explain these results. However, the results indicate that workers take account
5The effect of average co-worker productivity on subsequent individual productivity is in the
range 0.25–0.5 in alternative models such as in a random-effects specification and a “static” fixed
effects specification where β1 in equation (1) is assumed to be zero. The estimated effects in these
models are significant at the 1% level. These results are available upon request.
6The correlation between individual productivity previous week and first quartile previous week
is -.604, and the correlation between individual productivity previous week and fourth quartile
previous week is +.556.
16
of the effects of their efforts on their co-workers, either because they feel pressure to
do so or because they use relevant new information.
5.1.1 Placebo tests
The results in Table 4 are consistent with both social pressure, pressure from the
team leader and information exchanges, and cooperation between the team members.
To test whether the results are specific to the teams to which workers actually belong,
we form pseudo teams, that is, we create new teams by drawing random samples of
workers and re-estimating the models. If gaps in productivity from a random set of
co-workers affect individual productivity, we cannot explain the results in Table 4
using team-related factors.
Table 5 provides the results of the placebo test. As shown, individual produc-
tivity is unrelated to either average productivity or worker position relative to a
random set of co-workers the previous week. Based on these results, we conclude
that the effects identified in Table 4 relate to the team to which workers actually
belong.
5.2 Mechanisms
The results in Table 4 are intended to capture the team effects arising from team-
based compensation, where the team effects include a number of potential mecha-
nisms.
One such mechanism is social pressure, where the workers experience disutility if
observed behaving selfishly by their co-workers. In this case, the workers correct for
gaps in previous productivity levels because of sanctions and social punishment by
their co-workers. Alternatively, social pressure could result from altruistic behaviour
whereby a worker experiences disutility even if no one notices. In this case, the
workers correct for gaps in previous productivity levels because they truly care
about the levels of pay-off for their co-workers.
Separating these social channels may be important because different workplaces
are organized differently. In settings where the workers are unable to observe each
other’s efforts, altruistic behaviour is the only effective mechanism for internalizing
the externalities present in many occupations. However, separating the different
social channels is difficult in our setting because the construction of teams is such
that all team members are able to monitor the effort of their co-workers. The existing
literature, including Bandiera et al. (2005) and Mas and Moretti (2009), finds that
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Table 5: Placebo results of team composition on individual
productivity
(1) (2) (3)
Individual productivity, 0.132∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
previous week (0.0059) (0.0095) (0.0083)
Pseudo team size 0.00109 0.00121 0.00076
previous week (0.00135) (0.00135) (0.00129)
Pseudo peers’ average -0.00627 -0.0165
productivity, previous week (0.0120) (0.0140)
First quartile in pseudo team, 0.0199 0.0103
previous week (0.0156) (0.0130)
Second quartile in pseudo team, 0.0140 0.0074
previous week (0.0122) (0.0111)
Third quartile in pseudo team, 0.0039 -0.0001
previous week (0.0100) (0.0096)
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Week fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Team-specific trends Yes Yes Yes
N × T 28593 28593 28996
Notes: The dependent variable is log of sales per logged hours of work as a measure
of individual productivity. Team-specific trends are linear. Stars denote significance:
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The pseudo teams are formed by drawing
random samples of workers in the call centre.
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externalities are in fact internalized only when the workers can be monitored by
their co-workers, indicating that social external pressure is an important mechanism.
However, our data are unable to provide evidence to support this conclusion.
A second underlying mechanism is co-operation and information exchanges be-
tween the members of the team. In settings where individual payment depends
on co-worker productivity the incentives to assist each other should be large, and
Siemsen et al. (2007) theoretically show that team-based incentives may give work-
ers an incentive to help each other in equilibrium. In this case, previous gaps in
productivity may have a positive effect on subsequent productivity because of new
information about the state of demand and assistance from co-workers.
The third possible mechanism explaining the results concerns the team leader.
In this case, previous gaps in productivity may have a positive effect on worker
productivity because of pressure and sanctions from the team leader. At the same
time, the team leader may be an important source of information for workers.
We may consider both social pressure and cooperation between team members
as co-worker effects arising from team-based compensation, whereas the team leader
effect may be important, even in the absence of team-based compensation. To
evaluate whether mechanisms exist within the teams that partly internalize the
externalities caused by team-based incentives, it is therefore important to separate
the co-worker effects from the team leader effect. The following section attempts to
shed some light on this issue.
5.3 Individual incentives and team dynamics
In the fourth quarter of 2006, the compensation structure in the service centre
changed radically; the power of the incentives increased and the sales bonus was
completely individualized. The new bonus scheme was in operation for a relatively
short period, and in the second quarter of 2007, the company reverted to the system
where individual payment depended on both individual and team sales. The six
month period (from 1 October 2006 to 31 March 2007) with high-powered individual
incentives provides an opportunity to examine to what extent the feedback on rank
position within a team depends on team incentives. This analysis may elucidate
why agents with low performance in the previous week increase their current effort;
that is, whether it results from team pressure or pressure from the team leader.
The transition from team-based incentives to individual incentives eliminates the
externalities between the members of the team, which in turn eliminates, or at least
limits, the incentives to exert pressure and co-operate within a team. The team
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leaders earn a fixed wage throughout the period, and there is no reason to believe
that pressure and sanctions from the team leader would change based on workers’
remuneration scheme.
To examine this question, we include interaction terms between the bonus system
(IBt) and quartile rank (Qi,g,t−1) in the model, where IBt is an indicator variable
equal to one when the workers were compensated based on individual productivity
only (IB = Individual Bonus) and zero when worker compensation also depended on
the overall productivity of the team. The empirical specification builds on equation
(1) and can be written in the following way:














i,g,t−1IBt + µt + µg + εi,g,t,
Any significant coefficients for interaction terms between IBt and Qi,g,t−1, that is
δ1, δ2, δ3, indicate that the transition to individual incentives had an impact on how
workers responded to previous gaps in productivity levels. The results in column (1)
of Table 6 show that the average co-worker productivity has no effect on individual
productivity, neither with nor without team incentives.
The results in columns (2) and (3) in Table 6 are more interesting. Column (2)
shows the results from the dynamic specification, while column (3) shows the results
without a lagged dependent variable. Both models indicate that placement in the
bottom quartile has no or a negative effect on current productivity during the period
when worker compensation solely depended on individual productivity. This shows
that the effects reported in Table 4 are driven by team incentives; that is, without
team incentives, there is no indication that low performance in the previous week
spurs extra effort in the current week. This finding is consistent with an internal
assessment (given to us by the management) of the company’s experiment with
individual bonuses. A downside to abolishing the team pay was that it took away
the team spirit, the feeling of belonging to a production team and the willingness
to co-operate with other team members.
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Table 6: Transition from team to individual bonus (IB) system.
Dynamic fixed effects specification
(1) (2) (3)
Peers’ average productivity, 0.0382*** 0.0258*
previous week (0.0131) (0.0149)
Peers’ average productivity × IB, 0.0195
previous week (0.0431)
First quartile, 0.0341** 0.0481***
previous week (0.0159) (0.0136)
First quartile × IB, -0.0564* -0.0563*
previous week (0.0314) (0.0314)
Second quartile, 0.0180 0.0268**
previous week (0.0126) (0.0115)
Second quartile × IB, -0.0233 -0.0234
previous week (0.0333) (0.0333)
Third quartile, 0.0140 0.0191*
previous week (0.0104) (0.0100)
Third quartile × IB, 0.0001 -0.0001
previous week (0.0319) (0.0319)
N × T 28996 28996 28996
Notes: The dependent variable is log of sales per logged hours of work as a measure of
individual productivity. Stars denote significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
IB (Individual Bonus) is an indicator variable equal to one in the period where the
workers were rewarded based on individal productivity (number of sales) alone (from
the fourth quarter of 2006 to the second quarter of 2007), and not on team sales. Other
controls include individual productivity and team size. All regressions include fixed
effects for worker, week, and team-specific linear trends.
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6 Conclusion
The focus of this paper has been to analyse how gaps between individual and co-
worker productivity affect subsequent individual productivity. Our first measure of
gaps in productivity was the absolute distance between individual and co-worker
productivity levels. The results indicate, all else being equal, a positive relation-
ship between average co-worker productivity and subsequent individual productivity.
The estimated effect is relatively small, where a 10% increase in average co-worker
productivity results in a 0.4% increase in individual productivity the following week.
Herbst and Mas (2015) reviews the estimated spillover effect of worker productivity
on the productivity of co-workers in both laboratory experiments and field stud-
ies, and finds an average effect of 1.2%. Cornelissen et al. (2013); Jackson and
Bruegmann (2009) find similar results to ours. Herbst and Mas (2015) reviews the
literature and shows that our findings are at the conservative end.
Our second measure of the productivity gap was the position of workers rela-
tive to co-workers. The results indicate that placement in the bottom quartile of the
productivity distribution has substantial effects on subsequent productivity, whereas
the productivity level associated with placement in the first quartile is about 4%
higher when compared with placement in the lowest quartile. While the underly-
ing mechanisms are unknown based on the baseline results, they indicate that the
workers correct for gaps in productivity by increasing effort the following week.
A secondary objective of our study was to explore whether the effects are caused
by team-based compensation structures; that is, whether the workers themselves
internalize the positive externalities that are present in our setting. To address this
issue, we used a transition to individual incentives where there are no externalities
between the workers. The results indicate that the relative effect of placement in
the first quartile was significantly lower, or even negative, during the period when
worker compensation depended solely on individual productivity alone. Given no
change in the team leader’s incentives during periods with individual-based bonuses,
the results indicate that peer effects must be present in our setting, and that the
transition to individual incentives largely shifted the focus of workers away from the
efforts of their co-workers. This aligns well with the company’s own assessment of
the situation.
While we are not able to identify whether the effects are a result of social pressure
or co-operation within the teams, the results of this analysis could be important for
the designers of these types of bonus schemes. Overall, our results indicate that there
are mechanisms within the teams that partly internalize the externalities caused by
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team-based compensation structures, meaning that free-rider effects are not a serious
problem, at least in our particular setting.
Estimating team effects involves many challenges. First, the selection issue is a
natural concern in identifying co-worker effects. Our teams are set up by the man-
agement of the company based on a policy that teams should be as equal as possible
according to factors such as age, education, gender, work experience, and skills,
contrary to studies of endogenous team formation; see, for example Bandiera et al.
(2011). Even though we find some differences in team characteristics, information
from the company indicates that the teams are fairly balanced, and that our results
are not driven by team differences due to selection. We rarely observe that workers
change team.
A second issue is related to the bonus and compensation scheme in our data. The
call centre agents not only sell products but also provide customer service. They are
evaluated and compensated on both of these tasks. Moreover, the company’s bonus
scheme changed frequently during the sample period, which could mean that we are
not in equilibrium. Frequent changes could also lead to the employee gaming of the
compensation system. Thus, it might be difficult to establish a solid relationship
between co-worker effects and team-based bonus in our data. Third, our identifica-
tion strategy requires some stability in the composition of the team over time. Not
all workers are selling products every week because of sickness absence, holidays,
administrative duties, and quitting the job. If demand is constant over time, and
the number of team workers varies somewhat from week to week, this could give rise
to naturally occurring demand spillover effects instead of co-worker effects.
In addition, our model specification requires a key assumption; that is, worker
productivity is impacted by team interactions from the previous week but not from
the current week. If contemporary peer effects are in place, this could bias the re-
sults. Our model is based on the information flow in the company, in particular that
agents are informed about sales of team members the previous week on Mondays.
Thus, they are able to act on this information in that week. If sales vary randomly
from week to week, where lower sales one week are followed by a recovery the next
week, our identified effect resembles the mean reversion problem. We ran a placebo
test to ensure that the estimated effects are specific to the team by creating pseudo
teams, that is, we included each worker with a random set of co-workers and re-
estimated the models. Our results disappear in placebo experiments where workers
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